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1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis has renewed academic interest in the potential impact of
business cycle fluctuations on labor markets (e.g., Elsby et al. 2010). However, while
labor economists have studied on the short-run association between local labor mar-
ket conditions and real wages extensively for quite some time (e.g., Blanchflower
and Oswald 1990), longer-run effects of business cycle fluctuations on individual’s
wages have only more recently caught the attention of empirical research.1 Clearly,
even small initial wage shortfalls may, in the longer run, eventually accrue to sub-
stantial overall losses in lifetime earnings if initial wage losses resulting from poor
entry conditions persist.2
Indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that substantial losses in lifetime earn-
ings result from entering the labor market during an economic downturn, as opposed
to entering during an expansion.3 Oreopoulos et al. (2012) explore the effects of
entering the labor market during a recession on individuals’ earnings, using data on
Canadian college graduates who entered the labor market between 1982 and 1999.
They find a substantial initial wage penalty of about 9 % that only fades to zero after
the first decade of a worker’s career. A similar result is reported by Kahn (2010), who
focuses on male college graduates in the USA graduating sometime between 1979
and 1988. She finds that the group graduating in the worst economic situation incurs
a wage loss of up to 13 % each year, relative to those graduating in the best initial
conditions, and that this initial wage loss persists over the first 20 years of a workers’
labor market career. Similar results are reported by Oyer (2006), who shows that PhD
students in economics are considerably more likely to find a position at one of the top
universities in the USA if they graduate in times when the demand for economists is
high. In a related study, he finds that those MBA students who complete their train-
ing during a recession suffer from negative effects on wages (Oyer 2008). In both
studies, the long-term effects on income appear to stem from the fact that diverse
1Most studies estimating the short-run association between fluctuations in local unemployment rates and
wages find that wages vary negatively with local unemployment. This negative association is a very robust
empirical pattern; it has been shown to exist for a wide range of different countries, using very different
sources of data and diverse empirical specifications. See Nijkamp and Poot (2005) for a comprehensive
survey of this literature.
2Previous research has shown that the early years in a worker’s labor market career are of special impor-
tance (Gardecki and Neumark 1998; Neumark 2002). In terms of wages, Murphy and Welch (1990)
estimate that almost 80 % of all (i.e., lifetime) wage increases accrue within the first 10 years of labor
market experience. Moreover, movements across jobs are considerably more likely at the beginning of a
worker’s career than later on (Topel and Ward 1992).
3Various dimensions other than wages may be influenced by conditions at labor market entry. For example,
Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) show that entry conditions have long-lasting effects on individuals’
beliefs and preferences, while Kondo (2012) finds that the timing of marriage of both men and women is
influenced by entry conditions.
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employers hire workers entering the labor market under different conditions, there-
fore giving them access to distinct jobs. The entry job is thus significant for the future
career, and this appears to be of particular importance for highly educated individu-
als for whom the transition in and out of attractive positions is very low.4 Mansour
(2009) also focuses on college graduates in the USA and again finds negative and
persistent wage effects from entry into the labor force during a recession. Moreover,
he shows that failure to account for endogenous sample composition underestimates
both the immediate wage effects as well as the persistence of wage effects resulting
from initial labor market shocks.
Empirical evidence for countries outside the USA and Canada yields broadly sim-
ilar findings. Kwon et al. (2010) mainly use data from the Swedish labor market.5
They find that workers who enter the labor market during a boom are not only paid
higher wages, but that they are also promoted more quickly to higher ranks than
those who enter during an economic downturn. Stevens (2007) finds significant neg-
ative, albeit small, effects of initial conditions on wages in Germany (much smaller
than those found in the USA and Canada). In contrast to all other studies, however,
she finds that wage losses from poor entry conditions do not fade away, but actually
increase over time.6 The available empirical evidence also underlines the fact that
negative wage effects of initial labor market conditions are not confined to highly
skilled workers. Genda et al. (2010) focus on a separate comparison between men in
Japan and the USA with more or less education with respect to the effects of initial
conditions. They find negative effects of initial conditions for more highly skilled
workers in both countries. However, they only find negative wage effects for workers
in Japan with fewer skills. They argue that the specific hiring system and employ-
ment protection drive the persistence of the effects for Japanese, while the market for
less-skilled workers in the USA may indeed be quite close to a competitive market.
Consistent with this finding, Kondo (2008) reports that the initial effect of entering
the labor market during a recession on wages is less persistent for less-skilled workers
and for workers with weak labor market attachment in the USA.
4One important concern regarding the validity of these results is that schooling and first entry
into the labor force may be endogenous both because individuals may choose to stay in school
or continue further training when faced with high unemployment and low starting wages. Indeed,
several studies find that enrollment rates are high when unemployment is high and the opportu-
nity costs of schooling are low (Clark 2011). In line with these findings, both Kahn (2010) and
Oreopoulos et al. (2012) find the duration of schooling to be endogenous. Both tackle the endo-
geneity problem by instrumenting the unemployment rate at the time of labor market entry with
either the prevailing unemployment rate at a lower age or that in the predicted year of graduation.
Mansour (2009) presents direct evidence on sample selection over the business cycle based on AFQT
scores.
5Previous studies for European countries have mainly focused on the long-run effects of initial conditions
on employment rather than wages (e.g., Burgess et al. 2003; Raaum and Røed 2006).
6A similar analysis of wage effects for firm entry cohorts in the German manufacturing sector is given
by von Wachter and Bender (2008). However, their analysis is not confined to new labor market entrants,
but covers workers of all experience levels; their results are therefore not directly comparable to the other
studies mentioned.
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In this paper, we present estimates of the long-run effects of business cycle fluc-
tuations on young males’ wage profiles in the Austrian labor market and derive an
empirical estimate of the associated loss in lifetime earnings due to entering the
labor force during a recession, as opposed to entry during average aggregate condi-
tions or during a boom. We do so using Austrian social security records that contain
detailed individual earnings and employment histories for the universe of private-
sector employees from 1972 until 2005. We complement the available empirical
evidence on the long-run wage effects of labor market entry conditions with an analy-
sis for Austria, a labor market characterized by a high level of employment protection
and a centralized wage bargaining structure. We focus on low- and medium-skilled
workers, while most of the studies mentioned above focus on higher or even highest-
skilled workers (in terms of formal education).7 In the second part of the analysis,
we focus on changes in the quality of workers’ first employer over the business cycle
and the importance of first employers for individuals’ entry and subsequent wages.
Indeed, several previous studies have shown that workers’ initial placements may
have important effects not only on their entry wages but also on their subsequent
wages (e.g., von Wachter and Bender 2006; Oreopoulos et al. 2012). More specifi-
cally, initial job or task assignment may be important in the longer run if employers
assign otherwise identical workers to lower-quality jobs or tasks in recession, and
if jobs or tasks offer different opportunities for the accrual of human capital (e.g.,
Gibbons and Waldman 2006).8 Alternatively, workers’ initial job or task assignment
may have long-lasting effects on wages if workers accumulate human capital while
on the job that is not fully transferable to other jobs or tasks because it is specific to
a worker’s task, occupation, or industry.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our
data source, details the sample selection process, and discusses the construction of
our key measures. Section 3 presents the econometric approach for estimating long-
run wage effects of initial labor market conditions along with our main results. We
also present some robustness tests as well as some evidence on the importance of
endogenous labor market entry over the business cycle. In Section 4, we focus on the
impact of initial labor market conditions on the quality of workers’ first employer
and the importance of first employer on individuals’ subsequent wages. Section 5
concludes.
7Note, however, that workers in the Austrian labor market typically have some, potentially very special-
ized, vocational training, as a significant part of the initial vocational training in Austria is provided by dual
apprenticeship training schemes, i.e., practical training provided by firms coupled with part-time compul-
sory attendance at a vocational school. Apprenticeships last from 2 to 4 years, depending on occupation.
Full-time vocational and technical schools provide an important alternative to apprenticeship training and
also last up to 4 years. Details are available from the report by the Federal Ministry for Education, the Arts
and Culture (2008).
8Consistent with this line of argument, Kwon et al. (2010) find that workers who enter the labor market
during a boom are promoted more quickly and to higher ranks than those who enter during a reces-
sion, and Mansour (2009) shows that workers entering in a recession are initially assigned to lower-
paying jobs.
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2 Data and sample
2.1 Data source
We use individual-level social security records from the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD), a data source described in more detail by Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009).
The ASSD basically covers the universe of Austrian private sector workers from Jan-
uary 1972 until December 2005 and contains complete and precise information about
individuals’ annual earnings and daily employment histories. The data are there-
fore ideally suited for studying on the impact of labor market shocks on long-run
wage profiles because they allow us to construct individual wage profiles for a large
number of labor market entrants over a relatively long period of time.
2.2 Key measures
Our dependent variable for most of the analysis is the real daily wage, i.e., the real
wage per actual day of work, adjusted to 2007 prices. Wages are deflated with the
consumer price index and include additional/special payments such as a 13th month’s
salary or holiday pay.9 Real daily wages are computed as the average earnings over
all employers in a given year. This means that we first sum the total annual earnings
over all employers for any individual. We then divide overall earnings by the total
number of days worked in a given year, also summed over all employers for a given
individual and taking overlapping employment spells into account.
The regressor of main interest is the annual male unemployment rate, our measure
for external labor market conditions at the time individuals first enter the labor force.
We compute annual male unemployment rates from the individual-level employment
histories contained in the ASSD raw data. This procedure has the advantage that we
can calculate unemployment rates back until 1972 (compared to published statistics,
which only reach back until 1978) and at different levels of cross-sectional aggrega-
tion.10 Unless noted otherwise, we use the male unemployment rate for all workers
aged between 16 and 65 at the state level as our main regressor.
9The Austrian Central Social Security Administration collects these data with the purpose of administering
and calculating entitlements to old-age pension benefits. For this reason, the ASSD includes precise and
comprehensive information on annual earnings and daily employment histories. However, contributions to
the old-age pension system are capped because old-age pension benefits are limited to a maximum level.
As a consequence, annual earnings are only recorded up to the threshold which guarantees the maximum
benefit level (“Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage”, HBGr). Similarly, there is a base threshold below which
no (otherwise mandatory) social security payments accrue (“Geringfu¨gigkeitsgrenze”, GfGr). The two
censoring points vary over time in real terms: The lower censoring point increased from about 14 e in
1978 to about 26 e in 2005 (per day worked); the upper censoring point increased from about 78 e to
126 e per workday over the same period of time.
10We decided to extract yearly male unemployment rates for the age groups 16 to 65 and 16 to 25, both
at the state (“Bundesland”) level and at the common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS)
level. At the NUTS level, we use the most disaggregated level available (NUTS-3), which corresponds to
one or more political districts in Austria. There are total of nine different states and 35 different NUTS-3
regions in Austria. Yearly unemployment rates are within-year averages of monthly unemployment rates.
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2.3 Sample selection
Mainly for conceptual reasons, but also due to some data limitations, we do not work
with the universe of all labor market entrants but only with a specifically selected
sample. First, we restrict our attention to male entrants only. On the one hand, female
labor supply behavior over the life cycle is much more difficult to model than male
labor supply. On the other hand, we believe that the fact that most men work full
time allows us to largely circumvent the problem that the ASSD does not contain
information on working hours. Second, we select those workers who start their first
regular employment spell sometime between 1978 and 2000, allowing us to observe
at least five additional years of earnings for each worker because the data run until
the end of 2005 (see also the Appendix). As a final restriction, we focus on workers
aged between 16 and 21 at the time they first enter the labor force (i.e., start their
first regular employment spell).11 Essentially, this restriction excludes individuals
with higher education (most importantly, individuals with a university degree), but it
should include all or most individuals with an apprenticeship training or an education
of similar length and scope, such as full-time vocational school.12 Our final sample
thus consists of male low- and medium-skilled labor market entrants who started their
first regular employment between 1978 and 2000. We can observe these workers’ full
labor market career from the year they first enter into the labor force until the year
2005.
2.4 Sample description
Because we can follow all individuals from the year of their first regular employment
until the end of the data in the year 2005, the resulting data set would have been
too large from a practical point of view. In the following, we therefore work with
a 30 % random sample of all labor market entrants aged between 16 and 21 when
first entering into the labor force. This sample contains 217,587 unique individuals
and about 3.35 million individual wage observations (i.e., observations at the level of
individual×year).
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our final analysis sample. The first panel
shows individual-level characteristics. The average labor market entrant in our
11Because the ASSD does not contain a comprehensive measure for schooling, we use age at entry into
the labor force as proxy for education in the regressions below. To mitigate potential collinearity with year
of birth and year of entry, we use a slightly different variable as proxy in the regressions. Specifically, we
use the smaller of age at start of first regular employment and age at start of first registered unemployment
spell.
12Several arguments motivate the restriction on schooling. First, the timing of first labor market entry,
and thus the duration of schooling, may be endogenous. However, less-skilled workers are presumably
less likely to manipulate the duration of schooling. Furthermore, unobserved heterogeneity resulting from,
say, unobserved differences in inherent ability, is arguably a more urgent problem for workers with higher
skills. Moreover, we believe that our proxy for schooling works best for workers with low education levels.
Finally, only including less-skilled workers in the sample is an effective way of dealing with right-censored
wages (see also the Appendix).
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Table 1 Summary statistics, male labor market entrants 1978–2000
Mean Standard deviation
Individual-level characteristics
Age at start of first regular job 19.195 (1.007)
Age at first entry into the labor force 18.669 (1.431)
Duration of first regular job (years) 2.847 (4.335)
Any unemployment before first job 0.306 (0.461)
Unemployment days before first job 42.649 (101.181)
Blue collar 0.546 (0.498)
White collar 0.176 (0.380)
Aggregate-level variables
State-level unemployment rate 6.595 (2.897)
NUTS-3 level unemployment rate 6.645 (3.144)
State-level youth unemployment rate 4.941 (1.790)
Number of entrants aged 16-21 3,767.283 (1,451.150)
State of first entry into the labor market
Vienna 0.179 (0.383)
Lower Austria 0.173 (0.378)
Burgenland 0.025 (0.156)
Upper Austria 0.194 (0.395)
Styria 0.147 (0.354)
Carinthia 0.067 (0.251)
Salzburg 0.071 (0.256)
Tyrol 0.092 (0.289)
Vorarlberg 0.053 (0.223)
Year of first entry into the labor market
1978 0.033 (0.178)
1979 0.039 (0.194)
1980 0.046 (0.208)
1981 0.045 (0.207)
1982 0.042 (0.202)
1983 0.044 (0.206)
1984 0.048 (0.213)
1985 0.047 (0.212)
1986 0.046 (0.210)
1987 0.046 (0.210)
1988 0.048 (0.214)
1989 0.050 (0.217)
1990 0.049 (0.216)
1991 0.046 (0.209)
1992 0.042 (0.201)
1993 0.038 (0.190)
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Table 1 (continued)
Mean Standard deviation
1994 0.041 (0.198)
1995 0.040 (0.196)
1996 0.038 (0.192)
1997 0.040 (0.195)
1998 0.041 (0.197)
1999 0.043 (0.204)
2000 0.048 (0.214)
Number of unique individuals 217,587
All aggregate-level variables are computed from the individual-level raw data of the ASSD (see footnote
10). See also notes of Table 10
sample is about 19 years old when starting his first regular employment spell, and
he holds his first job for almost 3 years. The average age at the start of the first
job dovetails with the fact that mandatory schooling ends in the year when indi-
viduals attain the age of 16 and that apprenticeships usually last for 2 to 4 years.
The high fraction of blue-collar occupations is consistent with our intention of only
(or mainly) including individuals who received some kind of vocational training.
Interestingly, a substantial fraction of the sample (about a third) experiences some
unemployment before starting the first regular employment spell (these individu-
als are registered for unemployment benefits on average for somewhat more than
1 month). Consistent with this, we find that age at first entry (our proxy for school-
ing) is about half a year lower than age at the start of the first regular job, reflecting
the fact that the transition from education to work often involves short periods of
nonemployment.
The second panel shows various unemployment rates as well as the number of
labor market entrants. The different unemployment rates use different aggregation
levels (cf. footnote 10) and refer to different age groups, but all of them are limited to
the male population only. The unemployment rate in the year of labor market entry
averages about 6.6 %, irrespective of the chosen aggregation level (states or NUTS-
3 units). Youth unemployment rates at the time of entry are somewhat lower than
overall unemployment rates and equal about 5 % on average. Finally, about 3,750
male individuals aged between 16 and 21 enter the labor market in any given state
and year in the period 1978–2000.
The remaining part of the table shows the distribution of our sample of labor
market entrants across the nine different states and across years. The distribution
across states mainly reflects differences in population size. It may, however, also
reflect other differences between states (e.g., differences in the age distribution of
women). The distribution of entrants across years on the other hand looks fairly uni-
form, implying that the aggregate number of entrants aged between 16 and 21 has
not changed much over time.
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3 The persistence of initial labor market shocks
3.1 Graphical evidence on the evolution of wages and initial conditions
We start with a simple graphical depiction of our two key measures (i.e., cohorts’
wage profiles and the initial local unemployment rate). First, Fig. 1 shows wage pro-
files by entry cohort for all labor market cohorts who first entered the labor force
between 1978 and 2000. The black dots therefore represent average starting wages
for each entry cohort, and the dashed gray line thus shows how starting wages evolve
over time. Clearly, real starting wages have increased significantly over the period
of analysis, from about 38 e in 1978 to about 50 e in 2000. Also note that there is
some cyclical movement in starting wages over time which we expect to be related
to economic conditions prevailing in that year.
The solid colored lines, on the other hand, represent long-run wage profiles of
cohorts entering the labor market in different years. Cohorts’ wages clearly follow an
approximate concave path over time, implying that wage growth is highest in earlier
working years and then strongly flattens later on. The figure shows, for example, that
the 1978 entry cohort starts with a real wage of about 38 e per workday and experi-
ences a raise in real wage up to about 97e by the year 2005. On average, this cohort’s
compensation therefore more than doubles in real terms within the first 27 years of
labor market experience. Focusing again on the 1978 entry cohort, we see that this
cohort’s average wage grows by approximately 146 % (= [exp(0.9)−1] · 100 %)
3.
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Fig. 1 Long-run wage profiles, by labor market entry cohort. The figure shows average log real daily
wages by calendar year for each labor market entry cohort from 1978 to 2000. The dots thus show average
log starting wages for each labor market entry cohort, and the dotted line highlights the evolution of starting
wages. The filled lines show how entry cohorts’ wages evolve with increasing labor market experience
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in the first 27 years of experience. Evidently, most of this wage increase happens at
the early stage of the labor market career (i.e., the wage increase in the first 10 years
equals about 86 % (= [exp(0.62) − 1] · 100 %)).13
Panel (a) of Fig. 2 shows the evolution of state-level unemployment rates which we
use as our indicator for external labor market conditions at the time individuals first
enter the labor force. This figure shows that the period from 1978 to 2000 covers sev-
eral periods of both boom and downturn, and that the identifying variation in initial
labor market conditions therefore does not only stem from a few neighboring labor
market cohorts. The figure also illustrates that states not only differ in the level of
unemployment but also with respect to cyclical variations around a longer-run trend:
although all states see an increase over the whole observation period in general, there
are marked cyclical differences across states.14 The lower panel of Fig. 2 shows that
our observation period spans several ups and downs in the business cycle, and that
there is considerable differentiation in the strength of these variations across states.
We thus have both sufficient cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in our key
regressor that we can use to pin down the effect of local business cycle fluctuations
on wages.
3.2 Econometric framework
Because we primarily aim to estimate the long-run impact of economic shocks at
the time individuals started their first jobs, we must take care to allow the associ-
ation between initial conditions and wage to become weaker or stronger as labor
market experience increases while also using a generally flexible functional form of
wage profiles. Taking these issues into account, our basic and most parsimonious
econometric model is the following:
ln(yit ) = ur0j [i]α1 +κ(expit )α2 +
[
ur0j [i] · κ(expit )
]
α3 +ψj(t0)i +φt0i +θt +it , (1)
where yit denotes the real daily wage of individual i in calendar year t, expit the
potential labor market experience of i in year t, and ur0j [i] the unemployment rate as
prevailing in state j at the time individual i first entered the labor market. Function
κ(·) denotes that we allow for a flexible functional form with respect to labor market
13Wage profiles of different entry cohorts have somewhat distinct overall shapes. More specifically, the
figure shows that returns to experience generally decrease over time, meaning that younger entry cohorts
have considerably lower returns to labor market experience than older cohorts. For example, the 1995
cohort only realizes an average wage increase of about 58 % (= [exp(.46)−1]·100 %) in the first 10 years,
thus less smaller than that of the corresponding increase of the 1978 entry cohort.
14For example, and as highlighted in the figure, Burgenland (located in southeastern Austria) experienced
a huge increase in the unemployment rate from about 3 % in the late 1970s to about 8 % in the first
half of the 1980s, and then to about 9 % in the second half of the 1980s. Vorarlberg (situated in western
Austria), in contrast, experienced only a modest increase from about 1 % on the 1970s to about 3% in the
1980s. In 1992, however, Vorarlberg underwent a sharp decline in the local labor market conditions, when
unemployment jumped from about 3 % to about 7–8 %.
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Fig. 2 a Fluctuations in state-level unemployment rates, 1978–2000. The figure shows male unemploy-
ment rates for workers aged between 16 and 65, aggregated at the level of the state (“Bundesland”) and
computed from the individual-level raw data of the ASSD. Two of the nine states are graphically high-
lighted. “Vorarlberg” is situated in the western part of Austria (bordering Germany and Switzerland).
“Burgenland” is located at the eastern border of Austria (bordering Hungary in the east and Slovenia in
the south). b Residuals from a regression of the initial unemployment rate on a full set of year and state of
entry dummies
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experience.15 Note that we allow the effect of the initial unemployment rate on cur-
rent wages to vary as potential labor market experience increases by including the
interaction terms between the experience polynomials and the initial unemployment
rate. We also include a full set of dummies for state at entry and year of entry, denoted
by ψj(t0)i and φ
t0
i , respectively, throughout the analysis. Finally, we also control for
the aggregate business cycle θt which we parameterize using the aggregate yearly
unemployment rate, the log aggregate number of workers, as well as log aggregate
annual earnings.
As we will discuss in more detail below, our baseline (i.e., our preferred)
specification will include some additional regressors:
ln(yit ) = ur0j [i]α1 + κ(expit )α2 +
[
ur0j [i] · κ(expit )
]
α3 + ψj(t0)i + φt0i + θt
+x0i β1 +
[
φ
t0
i · κ(expit )
]
β2 + ln(n0j [i])β3 + it , (2)
where the second row contains these additional variables. First, x0i denotes a small set
of individual-level controls, i.e., our proxy for schooling and two indicator variables
for workers’ initial occupation (blue or white collar). These variables are predeter-
mined in the sense that they relate to an individual’s first regular employment spell
or to the time before having started to work (i.e., there is no time index for these
variables). We also include the full set of interaction terms between the year of entry
and the polynomial in potential experience as well as the log number of labor mar-
ket entrants aged 16–21 and aged 22–30 at the state level. The latter two variables
are included to control for changes in the relative number of entrants aged 16–21
(relative to all entrants aged in the age bracket 16–30); the former set of controls
allows for cohort-specific differences in the wage profile that are unrelated to differ-
ences in local initial unemployment rates but due to, say, changes in the production
of education across cohorts.
In either case, parameters α1 to α3 describe individuals’ wage–experience profiles
as a function of the initial unemployment rate and are the parameters of main interest.
Specifically, α1 is the elasticity of wages with respect to the initial unemployment
rate in the year of first entry (i.e., in the year where labor market experience is equal
to 0), while α3 tells us how the effect of initial conditions changes as labor market
experience increases.
One important complication of both specifications relates to the fact that the local
initial unemployment rate does not vary over time for any given individual. For this
reason, we cannot use standard panel data estimators such as the fixed-effects or
first-differences estimator because these methods not only eliminate all unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity but also all variation in the key regressor. We therefore
rely on estimation methods that use the untransformed data. We also have to consider
that our key regressor is observed at a higher level of aggregation than the dependent
15Specifically, we include the first three polynomial terms of potential labor market experience. We chose
the number of polynomial terms on the basis of a nonparametric, and therefore fully flexible, wage–
experience model. The first three polynomial terms appear sufficient for reproducing the wage–experience
profile that a corresponding nonparametric specification predicts.
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variable, a situation that may lead to grossly misleading statistical inference (Moulton
1986). All standard errors we report are therefore clustered by cells defined by year
at first entry × state of first entry (there are 9 states and 23 entry years, resulting in
207 distinct cells).16
3.3 Main results: initial labor market conditions and wages
Table 2 shows our main results, building up from our most parsimonious specification
represented by Eq. 1 to our preferred specification as given by Eq. 2. The top panel of
the table shows, for each specification, point estimates of the parameters describing
the effect of initial conditions on wages (i.e., α1, the coefficient on the local initial
unemployment rate, and α3, which represents the three interaction terms between the
local initial unemployment rate and years of labor market experience, its square, and
its cube, respectively), and the panel in the middle of the table shows estimated semi-
elasticities of wages with respect to the initial local unemployment rate at specific
values of potential labor market experience (i.e., potential labor market experience of
0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 years, respectively). For example, εyur(5) denotes the estimated
semi-elasticity of the real daily wage with respect to the initial unemployment rate
at 5 years of potential labor market experience. It thus corresponds to the estimated
relative change in wages resulting from a one percentage point increase in the initial
unemployment rate.
The first column shows point estimates for our most parsimonious specification as
spelled out in Eq. 1. As expected, there is a negative effect of the initial local unem-
ployment on wages in the year of entry. Specifically, the semi-elasticity of wages
with respect to the initial unemployment rate equals −0.009 in the year of entry. A
one percentage point increase in the local initial unemployment rate is thus predicted
to lower starting wages by 0.9 %. The corresponding standard error equals 0.002,
and thus the immediate wage effect is statistically highly significant. Moreover, the
middle panel of the table shows that there is substantial persistence of this negative
wage effect, and a negative and significant effect of initial labor market conditions
remains as much as 20 years after the first entry into the labor market. In fact, the
point estimate of the semi-elasticity at 20 years of experience is even larger than the
immediate wage penalty.
We add our small set of individual-level controls (i.e., our proxy for schooling
and two dummy variables indicating a worker’s initial occupation) in the second
specification. This has some impact on the estimated wage effects, especially in the
year of entry into the labor market (the immediate semi-elasticity of wages decreases
from 0.009 to 0.007), but otherwise, the coefficients are remarkably similar, and a
negative and strongly persistent wage effect of bad entry conditions remains, as the
middle panel of Table 2 reflects.
We replace our set of longitudinal controls with a set of biannual year dummies
in the third column. This yields estimates that are very similar to those from the
16We also computed standard errors that simultaneously account for clustering at both levels for our main
estimates. This yields standard errors that are virtually indistinguishable from those actually reported.
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Table 2 The long-run wage effects of initial labor market conditions
Dependent variable ln(real daily wage)
Mean 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257
Standard deviation 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380
ur0 −0.009


 −0.007


 −0.009


 −0.009


 −0.010


 −0.009



(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
exp ·ur0 0.000 0.000 0.001

 0.001

 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp2 ·ur0 −0.000


 −0.000


 −0.000


 −0.000


 −0.000
 −0.000

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp3 ·ur0 0.000


 0.000


 0.000


 0.000


 0.000
 0.000

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ε
y
ur(0) −0.009


 −0.007


 −0.009


 −0.009


 −0.010


 −0.009



(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ε
y
ur(5) −0.011


 −0.010


 −0.010


 −0.010


 −0.010


 −0.009



(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
ε
y
ur(10) −0.017


 −0.016


 −0.015


 −0.015


 −0.012


 −0.012



(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ε
y
ur(15) −0.021


 −0.020


 −0.019


 −0.019


 −0.015


 −0.014



(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
ε
y
ur(20) −0.015


 −0.015


 −0.014


 −0.014


 −0.018


 −0.017



(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Potential experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Longitudinal controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies (biannual) No No Yes Yes No No
Year of entry × κ(exp) No No No No Yes Yes
Number of entrants No No No No No Yes
Number of observations 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075
Adjusted R-squared 0.286 0.325 0.326 0.326 0.327 0.327
Lifetime loss 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by state at entry × year of entry. exp and
ur0 denote potential labor market experience (in years) and the initial unemployment rate (in percentages),
respectively. εyur(k) denotes the estimated semi-elasticity of wages with respect to the initial unemployment
rate, evaluated at k years of potential labor market experience

p < 0.1; 

p < 0.05; 


p < 0.01 (statistical significance)
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specification with parametric business cycle controls. The fourth column includes
both the set of biannual year dummies and our set of parametric longitudinal controls.
Again, the estimates hardly change, although the estimated semi-elasticities at higher
values of labor market experience are somewhat smaller than in the specification with
only a parameterized trend.
We next add the full set of interaction terms between the year of entry and the
experience terms. This allows for changes in the wage profile across entry cohorts
that are unrelated to initial conditions in a fully flexible way. The estimates again
remain more or less stable.
We finally add the log number of labor market entrants aged 16–21 and 22–30 in
the sixth column because there was a substantive drop in the relative number of labor
market entrants aged 16–21 relative to all entrants aged below 30. The specification
underlying the estimates shown in column 6 thus corresponds to the specification of
Eq. 2. Our baseline specification still yields an immediate negative and statistically
significant wage effect of about −0.009. Moreover, we find the wage penalty result-
ing from entering the labor market in times of high local unemployment to be highly
persistent. In fact, the wage penalty is even slightly increasing with labor market
experience, similar to what is found by Stevens (2007).
3.4 Robustness
Table 3 presents some different robustness checks. For the ease of comparison, the
first column simply reproduces our baseline estimates from column 6 of Table 2.
A first robustness check relates to the fact that a nonnegligible number of wage
observations is censored.17 Column 2 thus shows quantile (i.e., median) regression
estimates of our baseline specification. The short-run estimates are identical, but the
estimated wage losses turn out to be moderately larger at higher values of labor mar-
ket experience. More specifically, ε0ur(5) is already slightly larger when estimated
using a quantile regression, but the quantile regression estimate of ε0ur(20) is as much
as 35 % larger than the corresponding ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate. If any-
thing, censored wages will thus lead us to underestimate the wage effects resulting
from labor market entry in times of high local unemployment.
We add the interaction terms between our longitudinal controls and the experi-
ence terms in the third column to allow for the possibility that variations in the
business cycle affect workers differentially at different stages of their labor market
career. This, however, has no discernible effect on the estimated coefficients of our
key parameters. Most of the estimated semi-elasticities are virtually identical to our
baseline estimates.
We use different unemployment rates in columns 4 and 5 as another robustness
check. We use unemployment rates at the NUTS-3 rather than at the state level in
the fourth column (cf. footnote 10). Using the unemployment rate at the NUTS-3
level results in a smaller initial and a somewhat less persistent wage effect. This
17Appendix Table 10 shows that only few wage observations are censored in the year of entry. However,
top-censored wages become much more frequent as workers accumulate labor market experience.
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Table 3 Sensitivity analysis
Dependent variable ln(real daily wage) ln(earnings)
Mean 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 9.991
Standard deviation 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.656
ur0 −0.009


 −0.009


 −0.009


 −0.005


 −0.006


 −0.007



(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
exp ·ur0 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.001

 −0.001

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
exp2 ·ur0 −0.000
 −0.000

 −0.000
 −0.000

 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp3 ·ur0 0.000
 0.000 0.000

 0.000


 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ε
y
ur(0) −0.009


 −0.009


 −0.009


 −0.005


 −0.006


 −0.007



(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ε
y
ur(5) −0.009


 −0.011


 −0.009


 −0.007


 −0.011


 −0.012



(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ε
y
ur(10) −0.012


 −0.015


 −0.012


 −0.010


 −0.014


 −0.016



(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ε
y
ur(15) −0.014


 −0.019


 −0.015


 −0.013


 −0.016


 −0.019



(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ε
y
ur(20) −0.017


 −0.023


 −0.017


 −0.015


 −0.017


 −0.021



(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Estimation method OLS LAD OLS OLS OLS OLS
Unemployment rate State State State NUTS-3 Youth State
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Longitudinal controls × κ(exp) No No Yes No No No
Number of observations 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075
Adjusted R-squared 0.327 0.328 0.330 0.327 0.223
Lifetime loss 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.014 0.016
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by state at entry × year of entry. The
specification in column 1 is the same as in column 6 of Table 2. All specifications include the same set
of controls as in column 6 of Table 2 (“baseline controls”). The dependent variable is the log real daily
wage in columns 1–5 and log real annual earnings in column 6. We use the state unemployment rate for
men aged 16–65 (“state”) in columns 1–3 and 6, the NUTS-3 level unemployment rate for men aged
16–65 (“NUTS-3”) in column 4, and the state-level unemployment rate for men aged 16–25 (“youth”)
in column 5

p < 0.1; 

p < 0.05; 


p < 0.01 (statistical significance)
is most likely due to the fact that we also include entry-region fixed effects at
a finer aggregation level which tends to pick up more of the variation in wages.
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18 The specification in the fifth column uses state-level youth unemployment rates
instead of overall unemployment rates. The resulting wage effects are somewhat
larger but still reasonably close to our main estimates based on overall unemployment
rates.
Finally, the specification in the sixth column shows results when we use log
annual earnings instead of log daily wages as the dependent variable. In this case,
we get somewhat larger, but still very similar estimates to those in the baseline case.
The comparison with the effect on wages also implies that workers entering dur-
ing times of high local unemployment not only suffer from lower subsequent wages,
but also from fewer employment days throughout their labor market career (see also
our Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM) where we discuss the effect of initial
conditions on job mobility and unemployment).
3.5 Endogenous labor market entry
Instrumental variable estimates
One important issue that we have not yet considered is the fact that the composition
of the sample of labor market entrants may be endogenous with respect to variation
in the local business cycle, which may lead to inconsistent estimates of the effect of
initial conditions on wages.19 Various studies have tried to tackle this issue by instru-
menting the unemployment rate at labor market entry with the unemployment rate
at some earlier age or with the unemployment rate at the predicted date of gradua-
tion.20 We have thus tried a similar approach, instrumenting the local unemployment
rate at entry with the local unemployment rate at age 16, the age at which mandatory
schooling ends in Austria.
However, we have some serious reservations, at least in our context, regarding the
validity of this instrumental variable strategy. Most importantly, the instrument may
have a direct effect on subsequent wages, in which case IV estimates will be biased
(e.g., Angrist and Krueger 1994). To see why this may occur, note that the majority
18It may also reflect endogeneity of the local unemployment rate at lower aggregation levels, due to the
fact that workers move from regions with high unemployment to those with lower levels of unemployment
(Wozniak 2010).
19Bils (1985) and more recently Solon et al. (1994) and Blundell et al. (2003) have put forth this line
of argument. In fact, the timing of labor force entry and thus the composition of labor market cohorts
may be endogenous for several distinct reasons. First, some potential labor market entrants may refrain
from entering the labor market altogether. Second, both the choice of education as well as the duration
of schooling may be endogenous, as both job prospects are weak and opportunity costs of schooling are
low in times of high unemployment. Third, some workers may simply delay their entry when faced with
unfavorable entry conditions, either by registering for unemployment benefits or by staying out of the
labor force until they find a job. Whatever the underlying reason, if those workers who do not immediately
get a job are a selected group of all workers who intend to enter employment in a given year, then the
composition of the actual entrants changes along with corresponding changes in the unemployment rate
and thus potentially biases the estimated effect of the initial unemployment rate on wages.
20Kahn (2010), Kondo (2008) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012) use a similar instrumental variable strategy.
OLS and IV estimates are similar to those of Oreopoulos et al. (2012), but IV are substantially larger to
those of both Kondo (2008) and Kahn (2010). Two European studies, by Kwon et al. (2010) and Stevens
(2007), only show OLS estimates.
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of individuals, at least in our sample, start an apprenticeship training at the age of
16, as this is the age when mandatory schooling ends. In Austria, moreover, most of
the practical training is directly provided by firms which are free to decide whether
they want to offer apprenticeships. It is thus quite obvious that labor market condi-
tions may have an impact on firms’ decision to offer apprenticeships.21 Moreover,
economic conditions may not only impact the number, but also the type (i.e., quality)
of apprenticeship firms offer.
Table 4 shows OLS and instrumental variable estimates. As before, the first col-
umn replicates our baseline estimates from column 6 of Table 2. We first compare
our baseline estimates to the corresponding 2SLS estimates that instrument the local
unemployment rate at first entry with the local unemployment rate at age 16, shown
in the fifth column. The 2SLS estimate of the semi-elasticity in the year of entry into
the labor force is more than six times larger than the corresponding OLS estimate
(−0.059 versus −0.009), and the lifetime loss in the case of 2SLS is about four times
larger than in the baseline case (0.052 versus 0.013). While it appears reasonable that
2SLS estimates are larger than OLS estimates, signifying positive sample selection
in economic downturns, the size of the difference between the estimates is almost
suspiciously large. Thus, let us examine the reduced form estimates as well, shown
in column 3. Note that the immediate and medium-run wage losses are considerably
larger than those in column 1, while the estimates appear to converge at higher val-
ues of labor market experience. It seems hard to rationalize the difference between
columns 1 and 3 without considering the possibility of a direct effect of ur16 on the
dependent variable.
Finally, since both our proxy for the completed duration of schooling and/or train-
ing as well as individuals’ initial occupation may be endogenous with respect to the
unemployment rate age 16, we also show estimates that do not control for these char-
acteristics. Our baseline estimates are hardly any different, but note that the estimates
using the unemployment rate at age 16 increase considerably, resulting in 2SLS esti-
mates that are as much as ten times larger than the corresponding OLS estimates
(compare columns 6 and 2). These estimates are presumably too large to be plausible,
but we think that they can be easily rationalized by acknowledging that the instrument
has a direct impact on wages (through its impact on individuals’ schooling/training)
in which case 2SLS estimates are upwards biased.
Direct evidence on endogenous labor market entry
We complement the evidence from our IV estimates with some more direct evidence
on compositional effects from labor market entry conditions. A first piece of evi-
dence is provided in Table 5 that directly examines the association of entry conditions
21To the best of our knowledge, there is no relevant empirical evidence for Austria. However,
Muehlemann et al. (2009) provide evidence consistent with this line of argument for Switzerland, which
has an apprenticeship system very similar to that of Austria. Their results thus presumably carry over to
Austria.
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Table 4 OLS versus 2SLS estimates
Dependent variable ln(real daily wage)
Mean 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257 4.257
Standard deviation 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380
ur0 −0.009


 −0.011


 −0.059


 −0.135



(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.017)
exp ·ur0 0.000 0.000 0.005


 0.005



(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
exp2 ·ur0 −0.000
 −0.000 −0.001


 −0.001



(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp3 ·ur0 0.000
 0.000 0.000


 0.000



(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ur16 −0.029


 −0.052



(0.002) (0.003)
exp ·ur16 0.004


 0.004



(0.001) (0.001)
exp2 ·ur16 −0.000


 −0.000



(0.000) (0.000)
exp3 ·ur16 0.000


 0.000



(0.000) (0.000)
ε
y
ur(0) −0.009


 −0.011


 −0.029


 −0.052


 −0.059


 −0.135



(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.017)
ε
y
ur(5) −0.009


 −0.011


 −0.015


 −0.039


 −0.044


 −0.124



(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016)
ε
y
ur(10) −0.012


 −0.013


 −0.015


 −0.039


 −0.045


 −0.132



(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016)
ε
y
ur(15) −0.014


 −0.015


 −0.019


 −0.045


 −0.053


 −0.146



(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.017)
ε
y
ur(20) −0.017


 −0.017


 −0.021


 −0.050


 −0.055


 −0.152



(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.017)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Number of observations 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075 3,349,075
Adjusted R-squared 0.327 0.287 0.328 0.296 0.323 0.249
Lifetime loss 0.013 0.014 0.019 0.046 0.052 0.143
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by state at entry × year of entry. The
first column replicates the baseline estimates from column 6 of Table 2. All specifications include controls
for potential labor market experience, year of entry, state at entry, longitudinal controls, the interactions
between year of entry and κ(exp), as well as controls for the number of labor market entrants (“base-
line controls”). 2SLS estimates instrument the local unemployment rate at entry (ur0) with the local
unemployment rate at age 16 (ur16)

p < 0.1; 

p < 0.05; 


p < 0.01 (statistical significance)
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Table 5 Number of labor market entrants
Dependent variable ln(no. of entrants)
Mean 7.782 7.058 8.229
Standard deviation 0.662 1.030 0.720
ur0 −0.028


 0.009 −0.001
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Age of entrants 16–21 22–30 16–30
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 207 207 207
Adjusted R-squared 0.981 0.986 0.984
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log number of labor market
entrants in a given age group aggregated by gender and at state at entry × year of entry cells

p < 0.1; 

p < 0.05; 


p < 0.01 (statistical significance)
and the number of labor market entrants in different age brackets. The estimated
regression is as follows:
ln(ejt ) = ur0j tα + ψj + θt + εjt , (3)
with the dependent variable being the log number of labor market entrants in state
j and year t, and with ur0j t denoting the local unemployment rate in year t. We also
include state and year fixed effects, denoted by ψj and θt , respectively. The first panel
of Table 5 suggests that there is a nonnegligible and negative effect of current labor
market conditions on the number of entrants aged 16–21. The number of entrants
aged 16–21 is estimated to decrease by about 2.8 % for an increase in the local initial
unemployment rate by one percentage point. At the same time, the second and third
panels of Table 5 show that there is no statistically significant effect on either the
number of entrants aged 22–30 or the number of entrants aged 16–30, suggesting that
some of the potential entrants with low or medium duration of schooling/training are
permanently discouraged from entering the labor market at all, and thus that sample
selection over the business cycle occurs through changes at the extensive margin.
Table 6 complements the evidence from Table 5 by looking at the association
between the initial local unemployment rate and our two proxies for schooling.
Specifically, we regress our proxy for schooling si on the local initial unemployment
rate and additional controls:
si = ur0j [i]α + ψj + θt + εi, (4)
with ur0j [i] again denoting the local initial unemployment rate, and with ψj and θt
denoting fixed effects for state at entry and year of entry, respectively. Based on the
results from Table 4, we also include the local unemployment rate at age 16 in some
specifications. The results for our first measure of schooling, age at first entry into
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Table 6 Age at first entry into the labor market and age at start of first regular job
Dependent variable Age at first entry into the labor market Age at start of first regular job
Mean 18.669 18.669 18.669 18.669 19.195 19.195 19.195
Standard deviation 1.431 1.431 1.431 1.431 1.007 1.007 1.007
ur0 −0.037


 −0.010 −0.006 0.438


 −0.007 0.448


 0.216



(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.032) (0.005) (0.034) (0.021)
ur16 −0.662


 −0.679


 −0.328



(0.028) (0.029) (0.022)
Age at first entry 0.529



(0.020)
State of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of entry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment before No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
first job
Number of entrants No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 217,587 217,587 217,587 217,587 217,587 217,587 217,587
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.267 0.267 0.397 0.057 0.333 0.674
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by state at entry × year of entry

p < 0.1; 

p < 0.05; 


p < 0.01 (statistical significance)
the labor market, yield somewhat mixed results (though the mixed results are proba-
bly due to the nature of our schooling proxies). While the first column shows a small
positive impact of entry conditions, we get a nonsignificant estimate once we con-
trol for individuals’ unemployment before their first regular employment. However,
once we also include the unemployment rate at age 16, the coefficient on the local
unemployment rate at entry turns significantly positive, while the point estimate on
the unemployment rate at age 16 is statistically negative (consistent with our discus-
sion of local labor market conditions at age 16 in Section 3.5 above, where we have
argued that local labor market conditions are likely to influence both the number and
the quality of apprenticeship positions). The second part of Table 6 shows similar
results for our second proxy for schooling, age at the start of one’s first regular job.
Once we control for the unemployment rate at age 16, we get a positive coefficient
on the local unemployment rate at entry. Also note, however, that the estimated coef-
ficients imply rather small effects on the average length of schooling/training in any
case.22
Taken together, the results from Tables 5 and 6 suggest that there is some, arguably
positive, sample selection in times of high local unemployment rates. For this
reason, we believe that it is plausible to argue that our baseline estimates provide a
lower bound on the true effect of labor market entry conditions on wages (or, rather,
22This result is perhaps not surprising because apprenticeship positions usually have a fixed duration of
either 3 or 4 years. Thus, in principle, it may be possible to observe no change in the average length of
schooling/training even if there is considerable downranking to lower paying jobs.
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the effect of labor market conditions on wages in the absence of any sample selec-
tion issues). More importantly, the OLS estimates probably better reflect the overall
effects of labor market entry conditions anyway: While OLS estimates reflect both
the effect of initial conditions on labor market entry (i.e., sample selection) and
wages, IV estimates reflect—ideally (i.e., if the instrument was valid)—the wage
effects from initial labor market conditions while eliminating any sample selection
issues. That is, in our context, IV estimates approximate a hypothetical or counter-
factual scenario in which workers are forced to enter the labor market in recession
and firms are forced to offer jobs in recession, respectively. If we are interested in the
overall effect of business cycle fluctuations on wages, OLS estimates thus seem to be
more informative exactly because they do not net out these compositional effects.
3.6 Quantitative implications
Our estimates so far imply a nonnegligible negative long-run wage effect from enter-
ing the labor market when the local unemployment rate is high. This is illustrated at
the bottom of each table, which, where applicable, shows an approximate estimate
of the lifetime loss in wages associated with a hypothetical increase in the initial
unemployment rate by one percentage point. The lifetime loss in wages (or any other
outcome considered) is computed simply as the average of the accumulated wage
losses within the first twenty years of labor market experience.
Our estimates from Tables 2 and 3 imply that an increase in the initial local unem-
ployment rate by one percentage point is associated with an approximate lifetime loss
in wages in the range of about 1 to 1.6 %, and our preferred specification yields an
approximate lifetime loss of 1.3 % for an increase in the local initial unemployment
rate by one percentage point. Moreover, according to our argumentation from the pre-
ceding section, this likely represents a lower bound (which in turn is consistent with
the fact that our 2SLS estimates are larger than our baseline estimates).
Finally, to better understand the true size and economic meaning of these numbers,
note that the estimated returns to to apprenticeship training in Austria are on the order
of about 3 to 5 % per year (Fersterer et al. 2008). The estimated wage loss resulting
from an increase in the local initial unemployment rate by one percentage point thus
approximately equals the value of about 0.26–0.4 a year of apprenticeship training.23
This comparison emphasizes that unfavorable labor market entry conditions indeed
have a sizable negative effect on workers’ lifetime wages.
4 Initial job assignment
4.1 Quality of workers’ first employer
Previous evidence strongly suggests that a worker’s first employer may play an
important role in explaining not only the immediate, but also the longer-run wage
23It is reassuring that the estimated coefficient on the proxy for schooling/training equals about 0.046
in our baseline specification (i.e., column 6 of Table 2), which is consistent with the reported external
evidence on the returns on apprenticeship training in Austria.
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effects resulting from labor market entry conditions (Oreopoulos et al. 2012; von
Wachter and Bender 2006). Different mechanisms may explain the observed impor-
tance of individuals’ initial placement. One important mechanism that may explain
cohort effects in wages starts with the observation that there is cyclical variation in
job and/or task assignment within jobs over the business cycle and that highly able
workers are assigned to jobs with lower-average quality in recessions (e.g., Dev-
ereux 2000).24 If, moreover, these jobs offer different opportunities for accruing
human capital or if, alternatively, a substantial part of human capital accumulated
on the job is specific to a worker’s task, occupation, and/or industry, then initial job
and/or task assignment is probably able to explain a significant part of the observed
persistent wage effects resulting from unfavorable initial labor market conditions
(e.g., Gibbons 2006).25 A similar argument is put forth in a more recent study by
Liu et al. (2012), who argue that cyclical skill mismatch can generate persistent wage
effects if at least part of the human capital acquired in a worker’s first job/task is
nontransferable to subsequent jobs/tasks and assuming that previously acquired (and
potentially superior) human capital depreciates while not put to use.
Inspired by this evidence, we also provide an analysis of the association of initial
labor market conditions and the quality of a worker’s first job, which we complement
with evidence on search frictions. We use a variety of different measures of the qual-
ity of workers’ first employment. The first two measures are firm-level compensation
measures, but we also look at a firm’s size and age and the possibility that it might
“disappear” within the following year or the following 4 years.26 We regress each
of these measures on the initial local unemployment rate and a couple of additional
control variables:
ω
k(t0)
i = ur0j [i]α + ψj(t0)i + φt0i + x0i β1 + ln(n0j [i])β2 + i, or (5a)
ω
k(t0)
i = ur0j [i]α + ψj(t0)i + φt0i + x0i β1 + ln(n0j [i])β2 + λk(t0)i + i , (5b)
where ωk(t0)i denotes some outcome for individual i who first enters the labor mar-
ket in year t0 at employer k. The local initial unemployment rate ur0j [i] is again the
regressor of main interest. We also include the same set of individual-level controls
x0i , the log number of labor market entrants n
0
j [i], as well as a full set of dummy vari-
ables indicating the state a worker resides in at entry, ψj(t0)i , and year of entry, φ
t0
i .
As the above, standard errors are clustered by year at entry × state at entry. We show
results with and without controls for an employer’s industry affiliation λk(t0)i because
24In line with these findings, Mansour (2009) finds that the quality of a worker’s first job is lower when
entry happens during high unemployment, even though cohorts entering during recession are positively
selected.
25See Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010) for evidence on task-specific, Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009) on occupation-specific, and Neal (1995) or Parent (2000) on industry-specific human capital.
Sullivan (2010) provides evidence that both occupation- and industry-specific human capital are decisive
in determining the level of wages.
26The “disappearance” of a firm identifier does not necessarily coincide with a plant closure because a
firm identifier may also disappear for other reasons (e.g., because of a take-over by another firm).
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of potential endogeneity. Estimates of α are shown in Table 7; estimates without
industry controls and estimates including industry controls are shown.
Consistent with previous evidence, we find considerable cyclical variation in most
of our performance measures for workers’ initial employer. Not surprisingly, the
first two columns of Table 7 show that entry in times of high local unemployment
is associated with starting one’s labor market career with an employer who pays
considerably lower compensation on average. Initial employers of workers enter-
ing at different labor market conditions also differ in other dimensions, however.
Specifically, columns 3–6 show that workers entering during times of high local
unemployment also tend to enter the labor market through firms that are younger
and smaller than first employers of workers who enter the labor force when the labor
market is tight. More remarkably, the final two columns show that those individuals
entering when unemployment is high are also much more likely to end up with an
employer who is doomed to fail in the near future.
The comparison between the two panels of Table 7 further suggests that some of
the downgrading during bad entry conditions occurs both across and within indus-
tries. For example, the first two columns show that the estimated coefficients on
wages and earnings are smaller if we control for industry affiliation of workers’ ini-
tial employers, implying that part of the negative effect on wages/earnings stems
from the fact that workers are more likely to start working with an employer from an
industry that offers lower compensation.
Because we neither have direct nor detailed measures of the schooling and training
actually acquired, we cannot provide any direct assessment on the importance of skill
mismatch as that by Liu et al. (2012). We can, however, provide some direct evidence
on the cyclicality of search frictions (which seems to be a natural precondition for
skill mismatch). Table 8 shows that workers who enter during high unemployment not
only end up working at a firm that is economically weaker, but that they also have a
more difficult time of finding an employer at all. Specifically, the first three columns
show that a higher local initial unemployment rate is associated with an increased
likelihood of experiencing an unemployment spell before starting regular employ-
ment, with longer unemployment, as well as an increased probability of experiencing
long-term unemployment even before starting one’s first regular employment spell.
Finally, the fourth column shows that workers entering during an economic downturn
are also more likely to start their labor market career through marginal (i.e., poorly
paid) employment.
4.2 The importance of the initial employer for the evolution of wages
Given this pronounced effects of initial conditions on various quality measures of
workers’ first employer, we next focus on the importance of workers’ first employer
on the evolution of their starting as well as subsequent wages. To this end, we simply
augment our baseline model, i.e., Eq. 2, with additional controls for a worker’s first
employer in a first step.
The first column of Table 9 again replicates our baseline estimates, without any
controls for an individual’s initial employer. In contrast, the specification in the
second column shows estimates from a regression that includes fixed effects for a
The impact of labor market entry conditions on initial job assignment and wages 729
Ta
bl
e
7
Qu
al
ity
o
ff
irs
te
m
pl
oy
er
D
ep
en
de
n
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
Lo
g
m
ea
n
co
m
pe
n
sa
tio
n
Fi
rm
ag
e
Fi
rm
siz
e
Fi
rm
id
en
tif
ie
rd
isa
pp
ea
rs
W
ag
es
Ea
rn
in
gs
Sm
al
l
M
ed
iu
m
La
rg
e
W
ith
in
1
ye
ar
W
ith
in
4
ye
ar
s
M
ea
n
4.
02
2
9.
63
8
10
.3
92
0.
41
5
0.
36
7
0.
21
8
0.
03
2
0.
11
8
St
an
da
rd
de
v
ia
tio
n
0.
31
0
0.
44
5
6.
61
9
0.
49
3
0.
48
2
0.
41
3
0.
17
6
0.
32
2
W
ith
ou
tc
o
n
tr
o
ls
fo
ri
n
du
str
y
af
fil
ia
tio
n
u
r0
−0
.0
16






−0
.0
26






−0
.1
24






0.
00
5



0.
00
3
−0
.0
07






0.
00
4





0.
01
3





(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
03
3)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
2)
A
dju
st
ed
R
-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
14
4
0.
07
7
0.
33
7
0.
03
0
0.
00
7
0.
05
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
1
W
ith
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
ri
n
du
str
y
af
fil
ia
tio
n
u
r0
−0
.0
11






−0
.0
15






−0
.0
26
0.
00
3
0.
00
3

−0
.0
07






0.
00
8





0.
02
3





(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
03
4)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
3)
A
dju
st
ed
R
-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
44
7
0.
38
9
0.
40
7
0.
19
3
0.
07
1
0.
29
6
0.
06
7
0.
18
3
In
di
v
id
ua
lc
o
n
tr
o
ls
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
St
at
e
o
fe
n
tr
y
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
ar
o
fe
n
tr
y
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
u
m
be
r
o
fe
n
tr
an
ts
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
um
be
r
o
fo
bs
er
v
at
io
n
s
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
R
ob
u
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
gi
v
en
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
an
d
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
o
n
st
at
e
at
en
tr
y
×
ye
ar
o
fe
n
tr
y.
Sm
al
l(m
ed
iu
m
,
la
rg
e)
fir
m
s
ar
e
fir
m
s
w
ith
1–
25
(26
–2
50
,2
51
+)
em
pl
o
ye
es


p
<
0.
1;




p
<
0.
05
;





p
<
0.
01
(st
at
ist
ic
al
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
)
730 B. Brunner, A. Kuhn
Ta
bl
e
8
Se
ar
ch
fri
ct
io
n
s
D
ep
en
de
n
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
U
ne
m
pl
o
ym
en
tb
ef
or
e
fir
st
re
gu
la
r
job
Lo
w
st
ar
tin
g
w
ag
e
In
ci
de
n
ce
D
u
ra
tio
n
Lo
n
g
te
rm
M
ea
n
0.
30
6
42
.6
49
0.
01
8
0.
02
5
St
an
da
rd
de
v
ia
tio
n
0.
46
1
10
1.
18
1
0.
13
5
0.
15
6
u
r0
0.
00
9





3.
69
8





0.
00
5





0.
00
4





(0.
00
2)
(0.
37
9)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
1)
In
di
v
id
ua
lc
o
n
tr
o
ls
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
St
at
e
o
fe
n
tr
y
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
ar
o
fe
n
tr
y
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
u
m
be
r
o
fe
n
tr
an
ts
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
um
be
r
o
fo
bs
er
v
at
io
n
s
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
21
7,
58
7
A
dju
st
ed
R
-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
30
5
0.
31
6
0.
08
3
0.
01
2
R
ob
u
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
gi
v
en
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
an
d
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
o
n
st
at
e
at
en
tr
y
×
ye
ar
o
fe
n
tr
y.
Lo
n
g-
te
rm
u
n
em
pl
o
ym
en
tb
ef
o
re
fir
st
re
gu
la
r
job
de
n
o
te
s
u
n
em
pl
o
ym
en
t
o
fm
o
re
th
an
1
ye
ar
.
Lo
w
st
ar
tin
g
w
ag
e
de
n
o
te
s
th
at
th
e
en
tr
y
w
ag
e
is
be
lo
w
1.
2
tim
es
th
e
lo
w
er
ce
n
so
rin
g
po
in
t(
cf.
fo
ot
n
o
te
9)


p
<
0.
1;




p
<
0.
05
;





p
<
0.
01
(st
at
ist
ic
al
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
)
The impact of labor market entry conditions on initial job assignment and wages 731
Ta
bl
e
9
Co
n
tr
o
lli
ng
fo
r
w
o
rk
er
s’
fir
st
em
pl
oy
er
D
ep
en
de
n
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
ln
(re
al
da
ily
w
ag
e)
M
ea
n
4.
25
7
4.
25
7
4.
25
7
4.
24
1
4.
24
1
4.
36
7
4.
36
7
St
an
da
rd
de
v
ia
tio
n
0.
38
0
0.
38
0
0.
38
0
0.
35
4
0.
35
4
0.
43
8
0.
43
8
u
r0
−0
.0
09






−0
.0
02
−0
.0
02
−0
.0
07






0.
00
2
−0
.0
10






−0
.0
02
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
ex
p·
u
r0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
−0
.0
00
−0
.0
00
0.
00
2





0.
00
2





(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
0)
ex
p2
·ur
0
−0
.0
00
*
−0
.0
00
−0
.0
00
−0
.0
00
−0
.0
00
−0
.0
00






−0
.0
00




(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
ex
p3
·ur
0
0.
00
0*
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0*
0.
00
0
0.
00
0



0.
00
0*
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
(0.
00
0)
ε
y u
r(
0)
−0
.0
09






−0
.0
02
−0
.0
02
−0
.0
07






0.
00
2
−0
.0
10






−0
.0
02
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
ε
y u
r(
5)
−0
.0
09






−0
.0
03
*
−0
.0
02
*
−0
.0
09






−0
.0
01
−0
.0
04




0.
00
5





(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
ε
y u
r(
10
)
−0
.0
12






−0
.0
04






−0
.0
04






−0
.0
13






−0
.0
04






−0
.0
02
0.
00
8





(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
ε
y u
r(
15
)
−0
.0
14






−0
.0
07






−0
.0
06






−0
.0
15






−0
.0
06






−0
.0
02
0.
00
9





(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
1)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
3)
(0.
00
2)
ε
y u
r(
20
)
−0
.0
17






−0
.0
08






−0
.0
07






−0
.0
16






−0
.0
07






0.
00
0
0.
01
1





(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
2)
(0.
00
3)
(0.
00
3)
Ba
se
lin
e
co
n
tr
o
ls
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
732 B. Brunner, A. Kuhn
Ta
bl
e
9
(co
n
tin
u
ed
)
D
ep
en
de
n
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
ln
(re
al
da
ily
w
ag
e)
M
ea
n
4.
25
7
4.
25
7
4.
25
7
4.
24
1
4.
24
1
4.
36
7
4.
36
7
St
an
da
rd
de
v
ia
tio
n
0.
38
0
0.
38
0
0.
38
0
0.
35
4
0.
35
4
0.
43
8
0.
43
8
Fi
rm
fix
ed
-
ef
fe
ct
s
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
Ti
m
e-
v
ar
yi
n
g
fir
m
co
n
tr
o
ls
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
BC
0
o
n
ly
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
W
C0
o
n
ly
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
um
be
r
o
fo
bs
er
v
at
io
n
s
3,
34
9,
07
5
3,
34
9,
07
5
3,
34
9,
07
5
1,
79
7,
90
8
1,
79
7,
90
8
56
3,
76
4
56
3,
76
4
A
dju
st
ed
R
-
sq
ua
re
d
0.
32
7
0.
50
4
0.
50
7
0.
24
7
0.
47
3
0.
43
7
0.
63
5
Li
fe
tim
e
lo
ss
0.
01
3
0.
00
5
0.
00
4
0.
01
3
0.
00
4
0.
00
3
−0
.0
07
R
ob
u
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
gi
v
en
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
an
d
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
o
n
st
at
e
at
en
tr
y
×
ye
ar
o
fe
n
tr
y.
Th
e
fir
st
co
lu
m
n
re
pl
ic
at
es
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
es
tim
at
es
fro
m
co
lu
m
n
6
o
fT
ab
le
2


p
<
0.
1;




p
<
0.
05
;





p
<
0.
01
(st
at
ist
ic
al
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
)
The impact of labor market entry conditions on initial job assignment and wages 733
worker’s initial employer and thus controls for all time-invariant employer character-
istics (whether observed or not).27 Estimates turn out to be markedly different from
those of our baseline specification. First, the estimated wage effect in the year of entry
is much smaller than in the baseline specification (−0.002 compared to −0.009),
and moreover, the estimate is no longer statistically significant. Thus controlling for
workers’ initial employer seems to pick up not only all of the short run but also most
of the long-run wage effect from poor entry conditions. Indeed, while the lifetime loss
in wages amounts to about 1.3 % in our baseline specification, controlling for both
observed and unobserved characteristics of the first employer only yields an estimate
of about 0.4 %. Thus, similar to that of Oreopoulos et al. (2012), controlling for the
characteristics of workers’ first employer explains most of the observed wage effects.
To explore the remaining negative wage effect in the longer run in somewhat
more detail, we next split the sample by initial occupation (i.e., blue-collar ver-
sus white-collar occupations).28 Columns 4 and 6 show results for blue-collar and
white-collar workers separately without controls for the initial employer, while
columns 5 and 7 show results with these controls. This shows that there are
remarkably distinct results by initial occupation. Specifically, even though the ini-
tial wage effect is statistically similar for blue- and white-collar workers, the
longer-run effect differs substantially between the two groups. Specifically, because
there is much less persistence in wage losses from poor entry conditions, the
long-run wage effects for white-collar workers are only about one-quarter the
size of those for blue-collar workers (our estimates imply an approximate loss
in lifetime wages of only 0.3 % for white-collar workers, compared to about
1.3 % for blue-collar workers).29 This result may emphasize that initial job and/or
task assignment and occupation-specific human capital are important in explain-
ing persistent wage effects especially because occupation-specific human capital
is arguably more important for blue- (e.g., craftsmen) than for white-collar jobs
(e.g., Sullivan 2010).30
27We further include controls for time-varying characteristics of initial employers in column 3, but these
variables do not have much additional impact on the estimated wage effects on top of the fixed effects for
first employer.
28Note that these two groups do not exactly add up to the overall sample size because some employment
spells cannot be uniquely identified as either blue or white collar (cf. Table 1).
29This result is somewhat surprising because previous research has shown that white-collar workers in
Austria suffer from much larger and more persistent wage losses from job displacement (Schwerdt et al.
2010). However, we use a totally different sample of workers than that of Schwerdt et al. (2010). Moreover,
our study focuses on low- and medium-skilled labor market entrants who entered the labor force between
1978 and 2000, while Schwerdt et al. (2010) focus on prime age workers of any educational level who
experienced a plant closure between 1982 and 1988.
30We provide some additional evidence that appears to be consistent and complementary with this expla-
nation in the Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM). These additional results show that the adjustment
in employer quality is incomplete for blue-collar workers, notwithstanding an increase in job mobility in
at least the first 5 years of their labor market career, and that there is a permanent increase in the risk
of job displacement. These findings suggest that some blue-collar workers entering the labor force in an
economic downturn are forced into, and persistently locked in, low-paying jobs and/or tasks.
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5 Conclusions
We estimate the long-run impact of initial labor market conditions on wages for
young males entering the Austrian labor market between 1978 and 2000. Consistent
with previous evidence, we find a substantial wage penalty from poor entry condi-
tions on starting wages. The estimated semi-elasticity of starting wages with respect
to the initial unemployment rate is on the order of −0.005 to −0.010, with our pre-
ferred estimate equaling −0.009 (implying that a one percentage point increase in
the initial local unemployment rate is associated with 0.9 % lower starting wages).
Moreover, this initial wage loss from first entry into the labor force during high local
unemployment turns out to be highly persistent. Consequently, we find sizable neg-
ative effects on lifetime wages. Our preferred estimates imply that an increase in the
initial local unemployment rate by one percentage point is associated with an approx-
imate loss in lifetime wages of about 1.3 %. Moreover, our estimates are close to the
results reported by Stevens (2007) for Germany and by Kwon et al. (2010) for Swe-
den. Our finding of persistent wage effects from poor entry conditions is also in line
with those of Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter et al. (2011) who study on labor earning mobil-
ity in Austria by using the same data source as we do, but a completely different
empirical approach.
We further show that there is considerable cyclical variation in the quality of
a worker’s first regular employment. Even though workers are positively selected
in times of high unemployment, they often end up working with employers that
generally pay lower wages. We also show that initial job and/or task assignment
within jobs is very important in explaining both the short- and long-run wage effects
from entry into the labor force during poor local entry conditions. In fact, con-
trolling for the characteristics of workers’ first employers can explain as much
as three-quarters of the observed long-run wage effects resulting from poor entry
conditions.
We finally find some very distinct patterns for blue and white-collar workers. The
negative wage effects fade away for white-collar workers after about 5 to 10 years,
while blue-collar workers suffer from very persistent negative wage effects from
poor labor market entry conditions. At least part of this difference appears to be
related to corresponding differences in the speed of quality adjustment of subsequent
employers between occupations, where only blue-collar workers are permanently
downgraded to lower-quality employers.
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Appendix A: Sample construction
We first determine the start of the first regular employment spell for each male indi-
vidual born between 1958 and 1985.31 The restriction with respect to year of birth, in
combination with the restriction on age at beginning of one’s first regular job that we
apply below, ensures that the potential range of age at first entry into the labor force is
the same for each entry cohort considered in the analysis (1978–2000). Additionally,
we drop all individuals who were self-employed and/or worked as a farmer or civil
servant at least once, because the data do not consistently cover these employment
spells over the whole period of analysis and/or because earnings are not recorded (in
the case of self-employment). We thus cannot fully observe the employment and/or
earnings histories of such individuals.
We then determine each individual’s age at the start of his first regular employ-
ment spell starting between 1978 and 2000. We define regular employment as an
employment spell which lasts for at least 180 days.32 We also focus on individuals
aged between 16 and 21 years at the start of their first regular employment spell. This
leaves us with 797,846 unique individuals (see Table 10), from which we take a sim-
ple 30 % random sample. This finally yields a total of 217,587 unique individuals
and 3,349,075 observations (= individuals × years) when following these individuals
over time.
Table 10 shows descriptive statistics for some key variables, by individuals’ age at
the time of first entry into the labor force. We consistently exclude individuals who
start their first regular employment after they attain age 30 because they presumably
never enter the labor force at all.33 The first column of Table 10 shows descriptives
for all individuals, and the second (third) column shows descriptives for individuals
aged 16 to 21 (aged 22 to 30) when starting their first employment. A comparison
of the second to the third columns shows that our sample restriction with respect to
age at the start of first regular employment works as expected. The sample of lower-
skilled workers, compared to the group of higher-skilled workers, contains a higher
fraction of blue-collar workers and has considerably lower wages on average and
shorter duration of the first regular employment spell.
Also note that, for the group of individuals aged between 22 and 30 when first
entering the labor force, highly skilled workers potentially are mixed up with lowly
31Obviously, an individual must be covered by the ASSD in order to be included in the sample. An indi-
vidual is covered by the ASSD if he or she is entitled to future social security benefits (typically old-age
benefits) or has already claimed social security benefits before first entering the labor force. Typically,
individuals “enter” the ASSD once they start working.
32Importantly, vocational training such as apprenticeship training is not considered as regular employment
(but as formal training).
33The group of individuals who enter at a later age probably consists of two very different groups, who
are indistinguishable from each other in the data. On the one hand, there are truly high-skilled workers
who enter the labor market at a later stage because they continued their education until that time. On the
other hand, however, there are also low-skilled workers who were never employed or only sporadically
employed before starting their first regular employment. Because schooling is not directly observed, we
would mix these two groups of workers together if we were to include them.
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skilled workers: individuals in this group of workers either spent much time in edu-
cation, were previously unemployed, or had short employment spells not counting
as regular employment. This is apparent from the proportion of workers below the
lower censoring point or above the higher censoring point. The probability of cross-
ing any of the two points is higher for the sample of older workers. Consequently, the
variation in the real daily wage (and thus productivity) is considerably smaller in the
sample of younger workers than in the group of older workers.
Table 10 Sample selection
Age at start of first regular employment
16–30 16–21 22–30
Real daily wage 50.488 (18.644) 47.536 (15.303) 56.742 (23.027)
Age at start of first job 20.863 (2.948) 19.200 (1.004) 24.386 (2.589)
Duration of first regular job 2.800 (3.995) 2.692 (4.035) 3.030 (3.900)
Blue collar 0.650 (0.477) 0.726 (0.446) 0.487 (0.500)
White collar 0.348 (0.476) 0.271 (0.445) 0.510 (0.500)
Below GfGr: yes = 1 0.059 (0.235) 0.050 (0.219) 0.077 (0.266)
Above HBGr: yes = 1 0.049 (0.215) 0.019 (0.135) 0.112 (0.315)
Region of employer
Vienna 0.239 (0.426) 0.198 (0.398) 0.326 (0.469)
Lower Austria 0.158 (0.365) 0.171 (0.377) 0.129 (0.336)
Burgenland 0.024 (0.152) 0.000 (0.000) 0.021 (0.142)
Upper Austria 0.168 (0.374) 0.183 (0.387) 0.137 (0.344)
Styria 0.139 (0.346) 0.145 (0.352) 0.129 (0.335)
Carinthia 0.065 (0.246) 0.066 (0.249) 0.062 (0.241)
Salzburg 0.070 (0.255) 0.071 (0.257) 0.067 (0.249)
Tyrol 0.090 (0.286) 0.091 (0.288) 0.087 (0.282)
Vorarlberg 0.000 (0.000) 0.049 (0.217) 0.000 (0.000)
Industry of employer
Agriculture 0.015 (0.120) 0.012 (0.108) 0.021 (0.142)
Electricity 0.007 (0.085) 0.009 (0.095) 0.003 (0.057)
Mining 0.006 (0.078) 0.007 (0.082) 0.005 (0.068)
Manufacturing 0.344 (0.475) 0.401 (0.490) 0.225 (0.417)
Construction 0.165 (0.371) 0.190 (0.392) 0.114 (0.318)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.150 (0.357) 0.159 (0.366) 0.130 (0.336)
Gastronomy, hotel business 0.060 (0.237) 0.046 (0.209) 0.089 (0.285)
Transportation 0.059 (0.236) 0.060 (0.238) 0.057 (0.233)
Finance 0.082 (0.274) 0.058 (0.235) 0.130 (0.337)
Cleaning, body care 0.009 (0.096) 0.008 (0.089) 0.012 (0.109)
Arts, entertainment, sports 0.010 (0.102) 0.005 (0.072) 0.021 (0.145)
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Table 10 (continued)
Age at start of first regular employment
16–30 16–21 22–30
Healthcare, welfare 0.014 (0.116) 0.006 (0.079) 0.029 (0.167)
Education, research 0.015 (0.121) 0.000 (0.000) 0.037 (0.189)
Lobbies, social security agencies 0.063 (0.243) 0.033 (0.180) 0.125 (0.331)
Housekeeping 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.022) 0.000 (0.000)
Number of observations 1,174,523 797,846 376,677
Table entries are sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Daily wages are given in
Euros. Real wage are deflated using the consumer price index with base year 2007. GfGr (“Ger-
infu¨gigkeitsgrenze”) and HBGr (“Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage”) denote the upper and the lower censor-
ing point with respect to earnings, respectively. “Below GfGr” is an indicator taking on the value 1 if the
nominal daily wage is equal to or below 1.2 times the lower censoring point and 0 otherwise. “Above
HBGr” is an indicator taking on the value 1 if the nominal daily wage is equal to or above 0.8 times the
upper censoring point and 0 otherwise
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